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Abstract
We consider the setting where players run the Hedge algorithm or its optimistic
variant [27] to play an n-action game repeatedly for T rounds.
• For two-player games, we show that the regret of optimistic Hedge decays
at rate O(1/T 5/6), improving the previous bound of O(1/T 3/4) by [27].
• In contrast, we show that the convergence rate of vanilla Hedge is no better
than O(1/
√
T ), addressing an open question posed in [27].
For generalm-player games, we show that the swap regret of each player decays
at O(m1/2(n logn/T )3/4) when they combine optimistic Hedge with the classi-
cal external-to-internal reduction of Blum and Mansour [6]. Via standard connec-
tions, our new (swap) regret bounds imply faster convergence to coarse correlated
equilibria in two-player games and to correlated equilibria in multiplayer games.
1 Introduction
Online algorithms for regret minimization play an important role in many applications in machine
learning where real-time sequential decision making is crucial [19, 7, 26]. A number of algorithms
have been developed, including Hedge /Multiplicative Weights [2], Mirror Decent [19], Follow the
Regularized / Perturbed Leader [20], and their power and limits against an adversarial environment
have been well understood: The average (external) regret decays at a rate of O(1/
√
T ) after T
rounds, which is known to be tight for any online algorithm.
What happens if players in a repeated game run one of these algorithms? Given that they are now
running against similar algorithms over a fixed game, could the regret of each player decay signifi-
cantly faster than 1/
√
T ? This was answered positively in a sequence of works [9, 24, 27]. Among
these results, the one that is most relevant to ours is that of Syrgkanis, Agarwal, Luo and Schapire
[27]. They showed that if every player in a multiplayer game runs an algorithm that satisfies the
RVU (Regret bounded by Variation in Utilities) property, then the regret of each player decays at
O(1/T 3/4). Can this bound be further improved?
Besides regret minimization, understanding no-regret dynamics in games is motivated by connec-
tions with various equilibrium concepts [15, 13, 12, 18, 6, 17, 22]. For example, if every player
runs an algorithm with vanishing regret, then the empirical distribution must converge to a coarse
correlated equilibrium [7]. Nevertheless, to converge to a more preferred correlated equilibrium [3],
a stronger notion of regrets called swap regrets (see Section 2) is required [13, 18, 6]. The mini-
mization of swap regrets under the adversarial setting was studied by Blum and Mansour [6]. They
gave a generic reduction from regret minimization algorithms which led to a tight O(
√
n logn/T )-
bound for the average swap regret. A natural question is whether a speedup similar to that of [27]
is possible for swap regrets in the repeated game setting.
∗Supported by NSF IIS-1838154 and NSF CCF-1703925.
Preprint. Under review.
Our contributions: Faster convergence of swap regrets. We give the first algorithm that achieves
an average swap regret that is significantly lower than O(1/
√
T ) under the repeated game setting.
This algorithm, denoted by BM-Optimistic-Hedge, combines the external-to-internal reduction of
[6] with the optimistic Hedge algorithm [24, 27] as its regret minimization component. (Optimistic
Hedge can be viewed as an instantiation of the optimistic Follow the Regularized Leader algorithm;
see Section 2.) We show that if every player in a repeated game of m players and n actions runs
BM-Optimistic-Hedge, then the average swap regret is at most O(m1/2(n logn/T )3/4); see The-
orem 5.1 in Section 5. Via the relationship between correlated equilibria and swap regrets, our result
implies faster convergence to a correlated equilibrium. When specialized to two-player games, the
empirical distribution of players running BM-Optimistic-Hedge converges to an ǫ–correlated equi-
librium after O(n log n/ǫ4/3) rounds, improving the O(n log n/ǫ2) bound of [6].
Our main technical lemma behind Theorem 5.1 shows that strategies produced by the algorithm
of [6] with optimistic Hedge moves very slowly in ℓ1-norm under the adversarial setting (which in
turn allows us to apply a stability argument similar to [27]). This came as a surprise because a key
component of the algorithm of [6] each round is to compute the stationary distribution of a Markov
chain, which is highly sensitive to small changes in the Markov chain. We overcome this difficulty
by exploiting the fact that Hedge only incurs small multiplicative changes to the Markov chain,
which allows us to bound the change in the stationary distribution using the classical Markov chain
tree theorem. We further demonstrate the power of this technical ingredient by deriving another
fast no-swap regret algorithm, based on a folklore algorithm in [7] and optimistic predictions (see
Appendix D). Both of these two algorithms enjoy the benefits of faster convergence when playing
with each other, while remain robust against adversaries (see Corollary 5.4 in Appendix C).
Our contributions: Hedge in two-player games. In addition we consider regret minimization
in a two-player game with n actions using either vanilla or optimistic Hedge. We show that op-
timistic Hedge can achieve an average regret of O(1/T 5/6), improving the bound O(1/T 3/4) by
[27] for two-player games; see Theorem 3.1 in Section 3. In contrast, we show that even under this
game-theoretic setting, vanilla Hedge cannot asymptotically outperform the O(1/
√
T ) adversarial
bound; see Theorem 4.1 in Section 4. This addresses an open question posed by [27] concerning the
convergence rate of vanilla Hedge in a repeated game.
The key step in our analysis of optimistic Hedge is to show that, even under the adversarial setting,
the trajectory length of strategy movements (in their squared ℓ1-norm) can be bounded using that of
cost vectors (in ℓ∞-norm); see Lemma 3.2. (Intuitively, it is unlikely for the strategy of optimistic
Hedge to change significantly over time while the loss vector stays stable.) This allows us to build a
strong relationship between the trajectory length of each player’s strategy movements, and then use
the RVU property of optimistic Hedge to bound their individual regrets.
Our lower bounds for vanilla Hedge use three very simple 2 × 2 games to handle different ranges
of the learning rate η. For the most intriguing case when η is at least Ω(1/
√
n) and bounded from
above by some constant, we study the zero-sum Matching Pennies game and use it to show that
the overall regret of at least one player is Ω(
√
T ). Our analysis is inspired by the result of [5]
which shows that the KL divergence of strategies played by Hedge in a two-player zero-sum game
is strictly increasing. For Matching Pennies, we start with a quantitative bound on how fast the KL
divergence grows in Lemma 4.3. This implies the existence of a window of length
√
T during which
the cost of one of the player grows by Ω(1) each round; the zero-sum structure of the game allows
us to conclude that at least one of the players must have regret at least Ω(
√
T ) at some point in this
window.
1.1 Related work
Initiated by Daskalakis, Deckelbaum and Kim [9], there has been a sequence of works that study no-
regret learning algorithms in games [24, 27, 14, 29]. Daskalakis et. al. [9] designed an algorithm by
adapting Nesterov’s accelerated saddle point algorithm to two-player zero-sum games, and showed
that if both players run this algorithm then their average regrets decay at rate O(1/T ), which is
optimal. Later Rakhlin and Sridharan [23, 24] developed a simple and intuitive family of algorithms,
i.e. optimistic Mirror Descent and optimistic Follow the Regularized Leader, that incorporate pre-
dictions into the strategy. They proved that if both players adopt the algorithm, then their average
regrets also decay at rate O(1/T ) in zero sum games. Syrgkanis et. al. [27] further strengthened
this line of works by showing that in a general m-player game, if every player runs an algorithm
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that satisfies the RVU property then the average regret decays at rate O(1/T 3/4). Syrgkanis et.
al. [27] also considered the convergence of social welfare and proved an even faster rate of O(1/T )
in smooth games [25]. Foster et. al. [14] extended [27] and showed that if one only aims for an
approximately optimal social welfare, then the class of algorithms allowed can be much broader.
Recently, Daskalakis and Panageas [11] proved the last iteration convergence of optimistic Hedge
in zero-sum game, i.e., instead of averaging over the trajectory, they showed that optimistic Hedge
converges to a Nash equilibrium in a zero-sum game.
There is also a growing body of works [21, 5, 4, 8] on the dynamics of no-regret learning over
games in the last few years. Most of these works studied the dynamics of no-regret learning from
a dynamical system point of view and provided qualitative intuition on the evolution of no-regret
learning. Among them, [4] is most relevant, in which Bailey and Piliouras proved an Ω(
√
T ) lower
bound on the convergence rate of online gradient descent [30] for the 2× 2Matching Pennies game.
However, we remark that their lower bound only works for online gradient descent and they need
to fix the learning rate η to 1. Our lower bound for vanilla Hedge in two-player games holds for
arbitrary learning rates.
2 Preliminary
Notation. Given two positive integers n ≤ m, we use [n] to denote {1, . . . , n} and [n : m] to denote
{n, . . . ,m}. We use DKL(p‖q) to denote the KL divergence with natural logarithm.
Repeated games and regrets. Consider a game G played between m players, where each player
i ∈ [m] has a strategy space Si with |Si| = n and a loss function Li : S1 × · · · × Sm → [0, 1] such
that Li(s) is the loss of player i for each pure strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S1 × · · · × Sm. A
mixed strategy for player i is a probability distribution xi over Si, where the jth action is played with
probability xi(j). Given a mixed (or pure) strategy profile x = (x1, . . . , xm) (or s = (s1, . . . , sm)),
we write x−i (or s−i) to denote the profile after removing xi (or si, respectively).
We consider the scenario where the m players play G repeatedly for T rounds. At the beginning
of each round t, t ∈ [T ], each player i picks a mixed strategy xti and let xt = (xt1, . . . , xtm)
be the mixed strategy profile. We consider the full information setting where each player ob-
serves the expected loss of all her actions. Formally, player i observes a loss vector ℓti with
ℓti(j) = Es−i∼xt−i [Li(j, s−i)], and her expected loss is given by 〈xti, ℓti〉. At the end of round T ,
the regret of player i is
regretiT =
∑
t∈[T ]
〈xti, ℓti〉 − min
j∈[n]
∑
t∈[T ]
ℓti(j), (1)
i.e., the maximum gain one could have obtained by switching to some fixed action. A stronger
notion of regret, referred as swap regret, is defined as
swap-regretiT =
∑
t∈[T ]
〈xti, ℓti〉 −min
φ
∑
t∈[T ]
∑
j∈[n]
xti(j) · ℓti(φ(j)), (2)
where the minimum is over all nn (swap) functions φ : [n]→ [n] that swap action j with φ(j). The
swap regret equals the maximum gain one could have achieved by using a fixed swap function over
its past mixed strategies.
Hedge. Consider the adversarial online model where a player has n actions and picks a distribution
xt over them at the beginning of each round t. During round t the player receives a loss vector ℓt and
pays a loss of 〈xt, ℓt〉. The vanilla Hedge algorithm [16] with learning rate η > 0 starts by setting
x1 to be the uniform distribution and then keeps applying the following updating rule to obtain xt+1
from xt and the loss vector ℓt at the end of round t: for each action j ∈ [n],
xt+1(j) =
xt(j) · exp(−η · ℓt(j))∑
k∈[n] x
t(k) · exp(−η · ℓt(k)) .
On the other hand, the optimistic Hedge algorithm can be obtained from the optimistic follow the
regularized leader proposed by [24, 27], and have the following updating rule:
xt+1(j) =
xt(j) · exp(−η(2ℓt(j)− ℓt−1(j))∑
k∈[n] x
t(k) · exp(−η(2ℓt(k)− ℓt−1(k)) , (3)
with ℓ0 = 0 being the all-zero vector. We have the following regret bound for optimistic Hedge.
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Lemma 2.1 ([24, 27]). Under the adversarial setting, optimistic Hedge satisfies
regretT ≤
2 logn
η
+ η
∑
t∈[T ]
‖ℓt − ℓt−1‖2∞ −
1
4η
∑
t∈[T ]
‖xt+1 − xt‖21. (4)
3 Optimistic Hedge in Two-Player Games
In this section we analyze the performance of the optimistic Hedge algorithm when it is used by two
players to play a (general, not necessarily zero-sum) n× n game repeatedly.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose both players in a two-player game run optimistic Hedge for T rounds with
learning rate η = (log n/T )1/6. Then the individual regret of each player is O(T 1/6 log5/6 n).
We assume without loss of generality that T ≥ logn; otherwise, the regret of each player is trivially
at most T ≤ T 1/6 log5/6 n. The following lemma is essential to our proof of Theorem 3.1. Consider
the adversarial online setting where a player runs optimistic Hedge for T rounds. The lemma bounds
the trajectory length of the strategy movement using that of cost vectors.
Lemma 3.2. Suppose that a player runs optimistic Hedge with learning rate η for T rounds. Let
ℓ0, ℓ1, . . . , ℓT be the cost vectors with ℓ0 = 0 and x1, . . . , xT be the strategies played. Then∑
t∈[2:T ]
‖xt − xt−1‖21 ≤ O(log n) +O(η + η2)
∑
t∈[T−1]
‖ℓt − ℓt−1‖∞. (5)
We delay the proof of Lemma 3.2 to Appendix A and use it to prove Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1 assuming Lemma 3.2. Let G = (A,B) be the game, where A,B ∈ [0, 1]n×n
denote the cost matrices of the first and second players, respectively. We use xt and yt to denote
strategies played by the two players and use ℓtx and ℓ
t
y to denote their cost vectors in the tth round.
So we have ℓtx = Ay
t and ℓty = B
Txt. Therefore, we have for each t ≥ 2:
‖ℓty − ℓt−1y ‖∞ = ‖BT (xt − xt−1)‖∞ ≤ ‖xt − xt−1‖1 and (6)
‖ℓtx − ℓt−1x ‖∞ = ‖A(yt − yt−1)‖∞ ≤ ‖yt − yt−1‖1.
Without loss of generality it suffices to bound the regret of the second player. Set η = (log n/T )1/6
with T ≥ logn so that η ≤ 1. We have
regretyT ≤
2 logn
η
+ η
∑
t∈[T ]
‖ℓty − ℓt−1y ‖2∞ −
1
4η
∑
t∈[T ]
‖yt+1 − yt‖21 Lemma 2.1
≤ 2 logn
η
+ η + η
∑
t∈[2:T ]
‖xt − xt−1‖21 −
1
4η
∑
t∈[2:T+1]
‖ℓtx − ℓt−1x ‖2∞ using (6)
≤ 2 logn
η
+ η + η
O(log n) +O(η) ∑
t∈[T−1]
‖ℓtx − ℓt−1x ‖∞

− 1
4η
∑
t∈[T−1]
‖ℓtx − ℓt−1x ‖2∞ +
1
4η
Lemma 3.2
= O
(
logn
η
)
+
∑
t∈[T−1]
(
O(η2) · ‖ℓtx − ℓt−1x ‖∞ −
1
4η
· ‖ℓtx − ℓt−1x ‖2∞
)
≤ O
(
logn
η
)
+ T ·O(η5) = O
(
T 1/6 log5/6 n
)
.
This finishes the proof of the theorem.
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4 Lower Bounds for Hedge in Two-Player Games
We prove lower bounds for regrets of players when they both run the vanilla Hedge algorithm. We
show that even in games with two actions, vanilla Hedge cannot perform asymptotically better than
its guaranteed regret bound of O(
√
T ) under the adversarial setting.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose two players run the vanilla Hedge algorithm to play a two-action game with
initial strategy (0.4, 0.6). Then for any sufficiently large T and any learning rate η > 0, there is a
game such that at least one player has regret Ω(
√
T ) after T ′ rounds for some T ′ ∈ [T : T +√T ].
Remark 4.2. Theorem 4.1 shows that even if players have a good estimation about the number of
rounds to play (i.e., between T and T +
√
T ), vanilla Hedge with any learning rate η(T ) > 0 picked
using T cannot promise to achieve a regret bound that is asymptotically lower thanO(
√
T ) for every
round T ′ ∈ [T : T +√T ]. We would like to point out that the use of (0.4, 0.6) as the initial strategy
instead of the uniform distribution is not crucial but only to simplify the construction and analysis.
Let T be a sufficiently large integer. We will use three gamesGi = (A,Bi), i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, to handle
three cases of the learning rate η, where
A =
(
1 −1
−1 1
)
, B1 =
(−1 1
1 −1
)
, B2 =
(
1 1
1 1
)
and B3 =
(
1 −1
−1 1
)
.
We use G2 to handle the case when η ≤ 64/(c0
√
T ) (see Appendix B.1) where c0 ∈ (0, 1] is a
constant introduced below in Lemma 4.3. We use G3 to handle the case when η ≥ 3 (see Appendix
B.2). The most intriguing case is when the learning rate η is between 64/(c0
√
T ) and 3. For this
case we use the Matching Pennies gameG1 = (A,B1).
Let xt and yt denote strategies played in round t by the first and second players, respectively. Let
x⋆ = y⋆ = (0.5, 0.5). The proof for this case relies on the following lemma, which shows that the
KL divergence between (x⋆, y⋆) and (xT , yT ) after T rounds is at least Ω(
√
Tη)).
Lemma 4.3. Suppose players run vanilla Hedge for T rounds with η : 16/
√
T ≤ η ≤ 3. Then
DKL(x
⋆‖xT ) +DKL(y⋆‖yT ) ≥ c0
√
Tη, for some constant c0 ∈ (0, 1].
We are now ready to prove Theorem 4.1 for the main case when 64/(c0
√
T ) ≤ η ≤ 3.
Proof of Theorem 4.1 for the main case. For convenience we let xt = x
t(1) (or yt = y
t(1)) denote
the probability of playing the first action in xt (or yt, respectively). We first describe the high level
idea behind the proof. Since we know the KL divergence is at least c0
√
Tη at time T by Lemma 4.3,
at least one of xT and yT is extremely close to either 0 or 1. Assume without loss of generality that
this is the case for xT . As a result, the probability of the first player playing the first action will not
change much for the next
√
T rounds. Consequently, during the next
√
T rounds, one of the players
must keep losing and the other player will keep winning. This can be used to show that one of the
two players must have regret at least Ω(
√
T ) at some point T ′ between T and T +
√
T .
To make this more formal, let ℓtx (or ℓ
t
y) denote the cost vector of the first (or the second) player at
round t and define Ltx and L
t
y to be the total loss up to round t of the two players:
Ltx =
∑
τ∈[t]
〈xτ , ℓτx〉 and Lty =
∑
τ∈[t]
〈yτ , ℓτy〉.
SinceG1 = (A,B1) is zero-sum, we have 〈xτ , ℓτx〉+〈yτ , ℓτy〉 = 0 and thus, Ltx+Lty = 0. Moreover,
noting that the sum of two rows of A is zero, the first player can always guarantee an overall loss
of at most 0 when playing the best fixed action in hindsight. Therefore, regretxt ≥ Ltx and similarly
regretyt ≥ Lty . Combining this with Ltx + Lty = 0, we have
max
{
regretxt , regret
y
t
}
≥ |Ltx| = |Lty|.
To finish the proof, it suffices to show that∣∣LT ′x ∣∣ = ∣∣LT ′y ∣∣ ≥ Ω(√T ), for some T ′ ∈ [T : T +√T ]. (7)
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Let L = c0
√
T/8 ≤ √T . We have from Lemma 4.3 that the KL divergence is at least c0
√
Tη (using
η ≥ 64/(c0
√
T ) > 16/
√
T ). We assume without loss of generality that DKL(x
⋆‖xT ) ≥ c0
√
Tη/2.
We further assume without loss of generality that the second term is larger:
1
2
· log 1
2(1− xT ) ≥
c0
√
Tη
4
.
It follows that xT is very close to 1: xT ≥ 1− exp(−c0
√
Tη/2), and we use this to show that xT+τ
remains close to 1 for all τ ∈ [L]. To see this is the case, we note that
xT+τ
1− xT+τ ≥ exp(−2ητ) ·
xT
1− xT ≥
1
2
· exp
(
−2ηL+ c0
√
Tη
2
)
=
1
2
· exp
(
c0
√
Tη
4
)
≥ 3,
where we used η ≥ 64/(c0
√
T ) in the last inequality. This implies xT+τ ≥ 3/4 for all τ ∈ [L].
Now we turn our attention to the second player. Given that xT+τ ≥ 3/4 for all τ ∈ [L], yT+τ keeps
growing for all τ ∈ [L]. As a result there is an interval I ⊆ [L] such that (i) every yT+τ , τ ∈ I , lies
between 1/4 and 3/4; (ii) every yT+τ before I is smaller than 1/4; and (iii) every yT+τ after I is
larger than 3/4. Using a similar argument, we show that I cannot be too long. Letting ℓ and r be the
left and right endpoints of I , we have
3 ≥ yr
1− yr ≥ exp
(
η(r − ℓ)
2
)
· yℓ
1− yℓ ≥ exp
(
η(r − ℓ)
2
)
· 1
3
.
As a result, we have (r − ℓ) ≤ 6/η ≤ (3/32) · c0
√
T and thus, either (i) or (ii) is of length at least
Ω(L). We focus on the case when (ii) is long; the other case can be handled similarly.
Summarizing what we have so far, there is an interval J = [α : β] ⊆ [L] of lengthΩ(L) such that for
every τ ∈ J , both xT+τ and yT+τ are at least 3/4. This implies that the total loss of the first player
grows by Ω(1) each round and thus, LT+βx − LT+αx ≥ Ω(L). Therefore, either |LT+αx | ≥ Ω(L) or|LT+βx | ≥ Ω(L). This finishes the proof of (7) using L = Ω(
√
T ) and the proof of the theorem.
5 Faster Convergence of Swap Regrets
Under the adversarial online model, Blum and Mansour [6] gave a black-box reduction showing
that any algorithm that achieve good regrets can be converted into an algorithm that achieves good
swap regrets. In this section we show that if every player in a repeated game runs their algorithm
with optimistic Hedge as its core, then the swap regret of each player can be bounded from above
by O((n log n)3/4(mT )1/4), wherem is the number of players and n is the number of actions.
We start with an overview on the reduction framework of [6], which we will refer to as the BM
algorithm. Let S = [n] be the set of available actions. Given an algorithm ALG that achieves good
regrets, the BM algorithm instantiates n copies ALG1, . . . , ALGn of ALG over S. At the beginning of
each round t = 1, . . . , T , the BM algorithm receives a distribution qti over S from ALGi for each
i ∈ [n], and plays xt, which is the unique distribution over S that satisfies xt = xtQt, where Qt is
the n × n matrix with row vectors qt1, . . . , qtn. After receiving the loss vector ℓt, the BM algorithm
experiences a loss of 〈xt, ℓt〉 and distributes xt(i) · ℓt to ALGi as its loss vector in round t.
We are now ready to state our main theorem of this section:
Theorem 5.1. Suppose that every player in a repeated game runs the BM algorithm with optimistic
Hedge as ALG and sets the learning rate of the latter to be η = (n logn/(m2T ))1/4. Then the swap
regret of each player is O((n log n)3/4 · (m2T )1/4).
For convenience we refer to the BM algorithm with optimistic Hedge as BM-Optimistic-Hedge
in the rest of the section. We first combine the analysis of [6] for the BM algorithm and Lemma 3
to obtain the following bound for the swap regret of BM-Optimistic-Hedge under the adversarial
setting, in terms of the total path length of cost vectors the player’s mixed strategies:
Lemma 5.2. Suppose that a player runs BM-Optimistic-Hedgewith η > 0 for T rounds. Then
swap-regretT ≤
2n logn
η
+ 2η
(
T∑
t=2
‖xt − xt−1‖21 +
T∑
t=1
‖ℓt − ℓt−1‖2∞
)
, where ℓ0 = 0.
6
Q =
(
1− ǫ ǫ
ǫ′ 1− ǫ′
)
x =
(
1
k + 1
k
k + 1
)
vs Q =
(
1− ǫ′ ǫ′
ǫ 1− ǫ
)
x =
(
k
k + 1
1
k + 1
)
Figure 1: Let ǫ′ = ǫ/k. Additive perturbations may change the stationary distribution dramatically.
The proof can be found in Appendix C.1. For the repeated game setting, we have for each t ≥ 2,
‖ℓti − ℓt−1i ‖∞ ≤ ‖xt−i − xt−1−i ‖1 ≤
∑
j 6=i
‖xtj − xt−1j ‖1
where the last inequality used the fact that both xt−i and x
t−1
−i are product distributions. Combining
it with Lemma 5.2, we can bound the swap regret of each player i ∈ [m] in the game by
swap-regretiT ≤
2n logn
η
+ 2η + 2ηm
∑
j∈[m]
T∑
t=2
‖xtj − xt−1j ‖21. (8)
We prove the following main technical lemma in the rest of the section, which states that the mixed
strategy xt produced by BM-Optimistic-Hedge under the adversarial setting moves very slowly
(by at most O(η) in ℓ1-distance each round). Theorem 5.1 follows by combining Lemma 5.2 and
5.3.
Lemma 5.3. Suppose that a player runs BM-Optimistic-Hedgewith rate η : 0 < η ≤ 1/6 under
the adversarial setting. Then we have ‖xt − xt−1‖1 ≤ O(η) for all t ≥ 2.
Proof of Theorem 5.1 Assuming Lemma 5.3. Let η = (n logn)1/4(m2T )−1/4. For the special case
when η > 1/6, the swap regret of each player is trivially at most T = O((n log n)3/4 · (m2T )1/4).
Assuming η ≤ 1/6, by Lemma 5.2 we have from (8) that
swap-regretiT ≤
2n logn
η
+ 2η + 2ηm2T · O(η2) = O
(
(n logn)3/4 · (m2T )1/4
)
.
This finishes the proof of the theorem.
The proof of Lemma 5.3 can be found in Appendix C.2. Here we give a high-level description of its
proof. Given that BM-Optimistic-Hedge runs n copies of optimistic Hedge with rate η, we know
that mixed strategies proposed by each ALGi move very slowly: ‖qti − qt−1i ‖1 ≤ O(η). However,
it is not clear whether this translates into a similar property for xt since the latter is obtained by
solving xt = xtQt. Equivalently, xt can be viewed as the stationary distribution of the Markov
chainQt composed by strategies of each individual expert ALGi, and its dependency onQ
t is highly
nonlinear. While there is a vast literature on the perturbation analysis of Markov chains, many results
require additional assumptions on the underlying Markov chain (e.g. bounded eigenvalue gap) and
are not well suited for our setting here. Indeed, it is easy to come up with examples showing that
the stationary distrbution is extremely sensitive to small additive perturbations (see Figure 1). As a
result one cannot hope to prove Lemma 5.3 based on the property ‖qti − qt−1i ‖1 ≤ O(η) only.
We circumvent this difficulty by noting that optimistic Hedge only incurs smallmultiplicative pertur-
bations on the Markov chain (see Claim C.5), i.e., each entry of Qt differs from the corresponding
entry of Qt−1 by no more than a small multiplicative factor of the latter. We present in Lemma C.2
an analysis on stationary distributions of Markov chains under multiplicative perturbations, based
on the classical Markov chain tree theorem, and then use it to prove Lemma 5.3.
We further prove that one can design a wrapper for BM-Optimistic-Hedge that is robust against
adversarial opponents:
Corollary 5.4. There is an algorithm BM-Optimistic-Hedge∗ with the following guarantee. If all
players run BM-Optimistic-Hedge∗, then the swap regret of each individual is O˜(n3/4(m2T )1/4);
if the player is facing adversaries, then the swap regret is still at most O˜((nT )1/2 + n3/4(m2T )1/4).
The proof is similar to Corollary 16 in [27]; we present it in Appendix C.3 for completeness.
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In the appendix we give two more extensions to our results on swap regrets.
1. In Appendix D, we show that incorporating optimistic Hedge into a folklore algorithm
from [7] can also achieve faster convergence of swap regrets, with a slightly worse
dependence on n. Interestingly, our analysis of this algorithm also crucially relies on the
perturbation analysis of stationary distributions of Markov chains.
2. In Appendix E, we study the convergence to the approximately optimal social welfare
(following the definition in [14]) with no-swap regret algorithms, and prove that O(1/T )
holds for a wide range of no-swap regret algorithms.
6 Discussion
In this paper, we studied the convergence rate of regrets of the Hedge algorithm and its optimistic
variant in two-player games. We obtained a strict separation between vanilla Hedge and optimistic
Hedge, i.e., 1/
√
T vs. 1/T 5/6. We also initiated the study on algorithms with faster convergence
rates of swap regrets in general multiplayer games and obtained an algorithm with average regret
O(m1/2(n logn/T )3/4) , improving over the classic result of Blum and Mansour [6].
Our work led to several interesting future directions:
• Our faster convergence result for optimistic Hedge currently only works for two-player
games. Can we extend it to multiplayer games? Second, what is the optimal convergence
rate for optimistic Hedge and other no-regret algorithms? even for two-player games?
• Regarding swap regrets, it is easy to generalize the result in Section 5 to any algorithm
that (1) satisfies the RVU property and (2) makes only multiplicative changes on strategies
each iteration. These include optimistic Hedge and optimistic multiplicative weights.
However, our current analysis does not apply to general optimistic Mirror Descent or
Follow the Regularized Leader. Can we still prove faster convergence of swap regrets via
the reduction of [6] without requiring (2) on the regret minimization algorithm? or does
there exist some natural gap between these algorithms and optimistic Hedge /
multiplicative weights?
• For our result in Appendix E on the convergence to the approximately optimal social
welfare, can this fast convergence result be extended to the (exact) optimal social welfare
setting (follow the definition in [27])?
• Can we achieve similar convergence rates under partial information models? such as those
considered in [24, 14, 29].
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A Missing proof from Section 3
Proof of Lemma 3.2 For each t ∈ [2 : T ], we apply Pinsker’s inequality to have
1
2
· ‖xt − xt−1‖21 ≤DKL(xt−1‖xt) =
∑
i∈[n]
xt−1(i) · log
(
xt−1(i)
xt(i)
)
=
∑
i∈[n]
xt−1(i) · log
∑
j∈[n]
exp
(−η(2ℓt−1(j)− ℓt−2(j))) · xt−1(j)

+
∑
i∈[n]
xt−1(i) · η(2ℓt−1(i)− ℓt−2(i))
= log
∑
j∈[n]
exp
(−η(2ℓt−1(j)− ℓt−2(j))) · xt−1(j)
 + η〈xt−1, 2ℓt−1 − ℓt−2〉
, Φt + η〈xt−1, 2ℓt−1 − ℓt−2〉, (9)
where we recall ℓ0 = 0. The third step follows from the updating rule of optimistic Hedge. Letting
Lt =
∑
i∈[t] ℓ
i, next we use induction to prove the following claim for each k = 1, . . . , T :
∑
t∈[k]
Φt = log
∑
j∈[n]
x1(j) · exp (−ηLk−1(j)− ηℓk−1(j))
 . (10)
The base case holds trivially, as Φ1 = 0. Suppose the above holds for k. Then for k + 1 we have
k+1∑
t=1
Φt =
k∑
t=1
Φt +Φk+1
= log
∑
j∈[n]
x1(j) · exp (−ηLk−1(j)− ηℓk−1(j))
+ log
∑
i∈[n]
exp
(−η(2ℓk(i)− ℓk−1(i))) · xk(i)

= log
∑
i∈[n]
exp
(−η(2ℓk(i)− ℓk−1(i))) · xk(i)
 ·
∑
j∈[n]
x1(j) · exp (−ηLk−1(j)− ηℓk−1(j))

= log
∑
i∈[n]
exp
(−η(2ℓk(i)− ℓk−1(i))) · x1(i) · exp (−ηLk−1(i)− ηℓk−1(i))

= log
∑
i∈[n]
x1(i) · exp (−ηLk(i)− ηℓk(i))
 ,
where the third step follows from
xk(i) =
x1(i) · exp (−ηLk−1(i)− ηℓk−1(i))∑
j∈[n] x
1(j) · exp (−ηLk−1(j)− ηℓk−1(j)) .
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Now we have (recall that Φ1 = 0)
1
2 ln 2
∑
t∈[2:T ]
‖xt − xt−1‖21 ≤
∑
t∈[2:T ]
(
Φt + η〈xt−1, 2ℓt−1 − ℓt−2〉
)
= log
∑
j∈[n]
1
n
· exp (−ηLT−1(j)− ηℓT−1(j))
+ ∑
t∈[2:T ]
η〈xt−1, 2ℓt−1 − ℓt−2〉
≤ − min
j∈[n]
(
ηLT−1(j) + ηℓT−1(j)
)
+
∑
t∈[2:T ]
η〈xt−1, 2ℓt−1 − ℓt−2〉
≤ − η min
j∈[n]
LT−1(j) + η
∑
t∈[T−1]
〈xt, ℓt〉+ η
∑
t∈[T−1]
〈xt, ℓt − ℓt−1〉
≤ η
2 logn
η
+ η
∑
t∈[T−1]
‖ℓt − ℓt−1‖2∞
+ η ∑
t∈[T−1]
〈xt, ℓt − ℓt−1〉
≤ 2 logn+ η2
∑
t∈[T−1]
‖ℓt − ℓt−1‖2∞ + η
∑
t∈[T−1]
‖ℓt − ℓt−1‖∞
≤ 2 logn+ (η + η2)
∑
t∈[T−1]
‖ℓt − ℓt−1‖∞.
The first step follows from Eq. (9) and the second step follows from Eq. (10). The fifth step follows
from Lemma 2.1. This finishes the proof of the lemma.
B Missing proof from Section 4
B.1 Case when the learning rate is small
We handle the case when η ≤ 64/(c0
√
T ) = O(1/
√
T ) with the following lemma:
Lemma B.1. Suppose both players run vanilla Hedge on game G2 = (A,B2) with learning rate
η = O(1/
√
T ). Then the regret of the first player is at least Ω(
√
T ) after T rounds.
Proof. The loss of player 2 is invariant to the strategy of player 1. Thus her strategy stays at
(0.4, 0.6). Hence, for any t ∈ [T ], the loss for player 1 is always ℓ = (−0.2, 0.2) and we have
xt(1) =
0.4 · exp(0.2ηt)
0.4 · exp(0.2ηt) + 0.6 · exp(−0.2ηt) and
xt(2) =
0.6 · exp(−0.2ηt)
0.4 · exp(0.2ηt) + 0.6 · exp(−0.2ηt) .
One can verify that when t ≤ 1/2η, we have xt(1) ≤ 0.5 ≤ xt(2). Therefore, the regret is
regretxT =
∑
t∈[T ]
〈xt, ℓ〉 −
∑
t∈[T ]
ℓ(1) ≥
1/2η∑
t=1
〈xt, ℓ〉 −
1/2η∑
t=1
ℓ(1) ≥ 0 + 1
2η
· 0.2 = Ω(
√
T ).
Thus we complete the proof.
B.2 Case when the learning rate is large
We next work on the case when η ≥ 3. Recall that we write xt = xt(1) and yt = yt(1).
Lemma B.2. Suppose both players run vanilla Hedge on game G3 = (A,B3) with learning rate
η ≥ 3 Then the regret of the first player is at least Ω(T ) after T rounds.
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Proof. Intuitively, (A,B3) is a cooperation game, and it is beneficial for both players if they choose
to cooperate on one single action (by playing either (1, 2) or (2, 1)). However, when the learning
rate is too large, they actually mismatch in every iterations. Formally, we have
xt+1 =
xt · exp(η(1 − 2yt))
xt · exp(η(1 − 2yt)) + (1− xt) · exp(η(2yt − 1))
=
xt · exp(η(1− 2xt))
xt · exp(η(1 − 2xt)) + (1− xt) · exp(η(2xt − 1)) .
The second step follows from xt = yt for all t because A = B3 in the game. Motivated by this, we
define a sequence a0, a1, . . . where a0 = x0 = 0.4 and
at+1 =
(1− at) · exp(η(2at − 1))
at · exp(η(1 − 2at)) + (1 − at) · exp(η(2at − 1)) , for each t ≥ 0.
Then at = xt if t is even and at = 1−xt when t is odd. Furthermore, by Claim B.3 below, we have
η exp(−2η) ≤ at ≤ 0.4 for all t when η ≥ 3. Hence, we have
regretxT ≥
∑
t∈[T ]
〈xt, ℓtx〉 =
∑
t∈[T ]
(2xt − 1)2 =
∑
t∈[T ]
(2at − 1)2 ≥ Ω(T ).
This finishes the proof of the lemma.
Claim B.3. When η ≥ 3, we have η exp(−2η) ≤ at ≤ 0.4 for all t ≥ 0.
Proof. We prove by induction on t. The base case holds trivially for t = 0. Suppose the inequality
holds up to t. Then for t+ 1, we have
at+1
1− at+1 =
1− at
at
· exp (η(4at − 2)) , f(at).
By simple calculation, we know that f(at) takes maximium at η exp(−2η) or 0.4. Thus,
at+1
1− at+1 ≤ max
{
f(0.4), f(η exp(−2η))
}
≤ 2
3
,
which implies that at+1 ≤ 0.4. The second step above follows from
f(0.4) =
3
2
· exp(−0.4η) ≤ 2
3
,
using η ≥ 3 and
f
(
η exp(−2η)) ≤ 1
η
exp(2η) · exp (4η2 exp(−2η)− 2η) = 1
η
· exp (4η2 exp(−2η)) ≤ 2
3
.
Moreover, f(at) takes minimum at the smaller solution a of 4ηa(1− a) = 1. Thus,
at+1
1− at+1 ≥
1− a
a
· exp (η(4a− 2)) ≥ 4
3
· η exp(−2η),
where the second step used exp(η(4a− 2)) ≥ exp(−2η), a ≤ 1/2η and a ≤ 1/3. This shows that
at+1 ≥ η exp(−2η) using η ≥ 3, and finishes the induction.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 4.3
Note that the Matching Pennies game G1 = (A,B1) is zero-sum. It is known (see [5]) that the KL
divergence of vanilla Hedge in zero-sum games is strictly increasing. We give a careful analysis on
its increment each round when playingG1. (Recall that x
⋆ = y⋆ = (0.5, 0.5).)
Lemma B.4. Suppose both players run vanilla Hedge with η ≤ 3 on G1. Then for each t ≥ 0,
DKL(x
⋆‖xt+1) +DKL(y⋆‖yt+1)−
(
DKL(x
⋆‖xt) +DKL(y⋆‖yt)
)
≥ e−7η2xt(1− xt)(2yt − 1)2 + e−7η2yt(1− yt)(2xt − 1)2.
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Proof. Focusing on the first player, we have
DKL(x
⋆‖xt+1)−DKL(x⋆‖xt)
=
∑
i∈[2]
x⋆(i) · log
(
x⋆(i)
xt+1(i)
)
−
∑
i∈[2]
x⋆(i) · log
(
x⋆(i)
xt(i)
)
=
∑
i∈[2]
x⋆(i) · log
(
xt(i)
xt+1(i)
)
=
∑
i∈[2]
x⋆(i) · ηℓt(i) +
∑
i∈[2]
x⋆(i) · log
∑
j∈[2]
xt(j) · exp(−ηℓt(j))

= log
∑
j∈[2]
xt(j) · exp(−ηℓt(j))

= log
(
xt · exp(−η(2yt − 1)) + (1 − xt) · exp(−η(1 − 2yt))
)
≥ xt · (−η(2yt − 1)) + (1− xt) · (−η(1− 2yt)) + 1
2e6
xt(1− xt)
(
e−η(2yt−1) − e−η(1−2yt)
)2
≥ η(2yt − 1)(1− 2xt) + e−7η2xt(1− xt)(2yt − 1)2. (11)
The third step follows from the updating rule of vanilla Hedge. The fourth step uses x⋆(1) =
x⋆(2) = 0.5 and ℓt(1) + ℓt(2) = (2yt − 1) + (1 − 2yt) = 0. The sixth step uses the fact that
f(x) = − log x is e−6-strongly convex on (0, e3). Similarly, we can prove
DKL(y
⋆‖yt+1)−DKL(y⋆‖yt) ≥ η(2xt − 1)(2yt − 1) + e−7η2yt(1− yt)(2xt − 1)2. (12)
The lemma follows by combining (11) and (12).
We are now ready to prove Lemma 4.3.
Proof of Lemma 4.3. We first prove that within O(1/η2) steps, the KL divergence DKL(x
⋆‖xt) +
DKL(y
⋆‖yt) becomes at least 20. The proof follows directly from Lemma B.4, as for any t with
DKL(x
⋆‖xt) +DKL(y⋆‖yt) ≤ 20, we have
DKL(x
⋆‖xt+1) +DKL(y⋆‖yt+1)−
(
DKL(x
⋆‖xt) +DKL(y⋆‖yt)
)
≥ e−7η2xt(1− xt)(2yt − 1)2 + e−7η2yt(1− yt)(2xt − 1)2 ≥ Ω(η2). (13)
The second step follows from the fact that both xt and yt are bounded away from 0 and 1 given the
divergence at t is at most 20; it also usedmax{|2xt − 1|, |2yt− 1|} ≥ 0.2 given that the divergence
is strictly increasing.
Let T0 = O(1/η
2) be the first time when the divergence becomes at least 20. If T/2 ≤ T0, it follows
from (13) that the divergence at T isΩ(Tη2) = Ω(
√
Tη) using the assumption that η ≥ 16/√T . So
we focus on the case T0 ≤ T/2 and thus, T = T0 + L with L ≥ T/2. We prove
Claim B.5. At round t = T0 + τ
2, the KL divergence hasDKL(x
⋆‖xt) +DKL(y⋆‖yt) ≥ 10−10τη.
Setting τ =
√
T/2 so that T0 + τ
2 ≤ T , we have
DKL(x
⋆‖xT ) +DKL(y⋆‖yT ) ≥ Ω(
√
Tη),
and this finishes the proof of the lemma.
Proof of Claim B.5. We proceed to use induction on τ . The cases with τ ≤ 16/η holds trivially as
the KL divergence at T0 is already at least 20. For the induction step, suppose the claim holds up to
k for some k ≥ 64/η at time t0 = T0 + k2. We show that at time T0 + (k + 1)2 the KL divergence
is at least 10−10(k + 1)η. Without loss of generality, we assume that xt0 , yt0 ≥ 0.5; the other three
cases can be handled similarly. In this region, xt with t = t0 + 1, . . . will keep decreasing and yt
will keep increasing, until the moment when xt drops below 0.5.
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Let t2 denote the first round t2 > t0 such that xt ≤ 0.5. We first show that it will take no more
than k/2 rounds for xt to drop below 0.5: t2 − t0 ≤ k/2. To this end, we use t1 to denote the first
round t1 ≥ t0 such that yt ≥ 3/4 and note that t1 ≤ t2 (since otherwise at t = t2 − 1, we have
1/2 ≤ yt ≤ 3/4 and 1/2 ≤ xt ≤ e6 in order for xt to go below 1/2 with η ≤ 3 in the next round;
this contradicts with the fact that the KL divergence is at least 20 after T0).
We break the proof of t2 − t0 ≤ k/2 into two phases: t1 − t0 ≤ k/4 and t2 − t1 ≤ k/4.
Phase 1. First we prove that it takes no more than k/4 steps for yt to get larger than 3/4. To this
end, we notice that for all t ∈ [t0 : t1 − 1], we have yt ≤ 3/4 and thus, xt ≥ 3/4 since the KL
divergence is at least 20. During all these rounds the loss vector ℓty of the second player satisfies
ℓty(1) ≤ −3/4 + 1/4 ≤ −0.5 and ℓty(2) ≥ 0.5. Thus we have (using 0.5 ≤ yt0 ≤ yt1−1 ≤ 3/4)
3 ≥ yt1−1
1− yt1−1
≥ exp (η(t1 − t0 − 1)) · yt0
1− yt0
≥ exp (η(t1 − t0 − 1)).
Thus t1 − t0 ≤ (2/η) + 1 ≤ k/4 using k ≥ 64/η and η ≤ 3.
Phase 2. Next we prove that, starting from t1, it takes less than k/4 steps for xt to drop below 0.5.
Note that for each t ∈ [t1 : t2 − 1], the loss vector ℓtx of the first player satisfies ℓtx(1) ≥ 0.5 and
ℓtx(2) ≤ −0.5. Moreover, we assume without loss of generality that 1− xt1 ≥ exp(−(k + 1)η/20);
otherwise the KL divergence at t1 is already bigger than 10
−10(k+1)η and we are done. Therefore,
1 ≤ xt2−1
1− xt2−1
≤ exp (− η(t2 − t1 − 1)) · xt1
1− xt1
≤ exp (η(−(t2 − t1 − 1) + (k + 1)/20))
Thus t2 − t1 ≥ 1 + (k + 1)/20 ≤ k/4 using k ≥ 64/η ≥ 64/3.
Now we are at time t2 and we examine the next R = 3/η ≤ k/2 rounds [t2 : t2 +R]; these are the
rounds where we will gain a lot in the KL divergence. Given that xt2 just dropped below 1/2, we
have xt2 ≥ 0.5 · exp(−2η) and thus, for every t ∈ [t2 : t2 +R],
xt ≥ xt2 · exp(−2η · R) ≥ 0.5 · e−12.
Consequently, we have
(
DKL(x
⋆‖xt2+R) +DKL(y⋆‖yt2+R)
)− (DKL(x⋆‖xt2) +DKL(y⋆‖yt2))
≥
t2+R−1∑
t=t2
e−7η2xt(1− xt)(2yt − 1)2 + e−7η2yt(1− yt)(2xt − 1)2
≥
t2+R−1∑
t=t2
e−7η2xt(1− xt)(2yt − 1)2 ≥ 3
η
· e−7η2 · 1
4
e−12 · 1
4
≥ 10−10η.
So we conclude that after at most k/4 + k/4 + k/2 = k steps, the KL divergence increase at least
10−10η. Thus at time T0+k
2+k ≤ T0+(k+1)2, the KL divergence is at least 10−10kη+10−10η
= 10−10(k + 1)η. This finishes the induction and the proof of the claim.
C Missing proof from Section 5
C.1 Proof of Lemma 5.2
Fix any swap function φ : [n]→ [n]. By Lemma 2.1, every ALGj achieves low regret. Thus,
∑
t∈[T ]
〈qtj , xt(j)ℓt〉 ≤
∑
t∈[T ]
xt(j) · ℓt(φ(j)) + 2 logn
η
+ η
∑
t∈[T ]
‖xt(j)ℓt − xt−1(j)ℓt−1‖2∞, (14)
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where we used xt = Qtxt, set ℓ0 = 0 and x0 = 1/n = x1. Consequently, we have∑
t∈[T ]
〈xt, ℓt〉 =
∑
t∈[T ]
〈xtQt, ℓt〉 =
∑
t∈[T ]
∑
j∈[n]
〈xt(j)qtj , ℓt〉 =
∑
j∈[n]
∑
t∈[T ]
〈qtj , xt(j)ℓt〉
≤
∑
j∈[n]
∑
t∈[T ]
xt(j) · ℓt(φ(j)) + 2 logn
η
+ η
∑
t∈[T ]
‖xt(j)ℓt − xt−1(j)ℓt−1‖2∞

=
∑
t∈[T ]
∑
j∈[n]
xt(j) · ℓt(φ(j)) + 2n logn
η
+ η
∑
t∈[T ]
∑
j∈[n]
‖xt(j)ℓt − xt−1(j)ℓt−1‖2∞
where the first inequality follows from (14). Furthermore, we have (using ‖ℓt‖∞ ≤ 1 and ‖xt‖1 =
1)∑
j∈[n]
‖xt(j)ℓt − xt−1(j)ℓt−1‖2∞ ≤
∑
j∈[n]
(
‖xt(j)ℓt − xt−1(j)ℓt‖∞ + ‖xt−1(j)ℓt − xt−1(j)ℓt−1‖∞
)2
≤ 2
∑
j∈[n]
‖xt(j)ℓt − xt−1(j)ℓt‖2∞ + 2
∑
j∈[n]
‖xt−1(j)ℓt − xt−1(j)ℓt−1‖2∞
= 2
∑
j∈[n]
(
xt(j)− xt−1(j))2 ‖ℓt‖2∞ + 2 ∑
j∈[n]
(xt−1(j))2‖ℓt − ℓt−1‖2∞
= 2
(
‖xt − xt−1‖22 · ‖ℓt‖2∞ + ‖xt−1‖22 · ‖ℓt − ℓt−1‖2∞
)
≤ 2
(
‖xt − xt−1‖21 + ‖ℓt − ℓt−1‖2∞
)
We can combine all these inequalities (and note that x0 = x1) to finish the proof of the lemma.
C.2 Proof of Lemma 5.3
We start the proof of Lemma 5.3 with the following definition.
Definition C.1. Given Markov chains Q,Q′ ∈ Rn×n, we say Q′ is (η1, . . . , ηn)-approximate to Q
if (1− ηi)q′i,j ≤ qi,j ≤ (1 + ηi)q′i,j for every i, j ∈ [n], where we write Q = (qi,j) andQ′ = (q′i,j).
We are ready to state our perturbation analysis on ergodic2 Markov chains.
Lemma C.2. Given two ergodic Markov chains Q and Q′, where Q′ is (η1, . . . , ηn)-approximate
to Q, the stationary distribution p, p′ of Q andQ′, respectively, satisfy ‖p− p′‖1 ≤ 8
∑n
i=1 ηi.
The proof of Lemma C.2 relies on the classical Markov chain tree theorem (see [1]). To state it we
need the following definition.
Definition C.3. Suppose Q is an ergodic Markov chain and G = (V,E) with V = [n] is the
weighted directed graph associated with Q. We say a subgraph T of G is a directed tree rooted at
i ∈ [n] if (1) T does not contain any cycles and (2) Node i has no outgoing edges, while every other
node j ∈ [n] has exactly one outgoing edge. For each node i ∈ [n], we write Ti to denote the set of
all directed trees rooted at node i. We further define
Σi =
∑
T∈Ti
∏
(a,b)∈T
qa,b and Σ =
∑
i∈[n]
Σi,
i.e., the weight of T is the product of its edge weights and Σi is the sum of weights of trees in Ti.
We can now formally state the Markov chain tree theorem.
Theorem C.4 (Markov chain tree theorem; see [1]). Suppose Q is an erogidc Markov chain and p
is its stationary distribution. Then we have pi = Σi/Σ for every i ∈ [n].
We now use the Markov chain tree theorem to prove Lemma C.2.
2Note that Qt used in BM-Optimistic-Hedge is always ergodic.
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Proof of Lemma C.2. Note that the lemma is trivial when
∑n
i=1 ηi > 1/4 so we assume without
loss of generality that
∑n
i=1 ηi ≤ 1/4. For any i ∈ [n], we have
Σi =
∑
T∈Ti
∏
(a,b)∈T
qa,b ≤
∑
T∈Ti
∏
(a,b)∈T
(1 + ηa)q˜a,b
≤
∏
j∈[n]
(1 + ηj)
∑
T∈Ti
∏
(a,b)∈T
q′a,b =
∏
j∈[n]
(1 + ηj) · Σ′i ≤
1 + 2 ∑
j∈[n]
ηj
Σ′i. (15)
The third step holds because for any tree T ∈ Ti, each node, other than node i, appears exactly once
as a when calculating the weight of T . The last step follows from the fact that when
∑n
i=1 ηi ≤ 1/4,∏
j∈[n]
(1 + ηj) ≤
∏
j∈[n]
eηj = e
∑
j∈[n] ηj ≤ 1 + 2
∑
j∈[n]
ηj .
Similarly, we have
Σi ≥
∑
T∈Ti
∏
(a,b)∈T
(1− ηa)q˜a,b ≥
∏
j∈[n]
(1− ηj) · Σ′i ≥
1− 2 ∑
j∈[n]
ηj
Σ′i. (16)
The last inequality holds since, for
∑n
j=1 ηj ≤ 1/2, we have∏
j∈[n]
(1− ηj) ≥
∏
j∈[n]
e−2ηj = exp
−2 ∑
j∈[n]
ηj
 ≥ 1− 2 ∑
j∈[n]
ηj .
Since Σ =
∑
iΣi, we have (1− 2
∑
i ηi) Σ˜ ≤ Σ ≤ (1 + 2
∑
i ηi) Σ˜. Applying Theorem C.4,
‖p− p′‖1 =
∑
i∈[n]
|pi − p′i| =
∑
i∈[n]
∣∣∣Σi/Σ− Σi′/Σ′∣∣∣ ≤ ∑
i∈[n]
∣∣∣Σi/Σ− Σi/Σ′∣∣∣+ ∑
i∈[n]
∣∣∣Σi/Σ′ − Σ′i/Σ′∣∣∣
≤
∑
i∈[n]
2
∑n
i=1 ηi
1− 2∑ni=1 ηi
∣∣∣Σi/Σ∣∣∣+ ∑
i∈[n]
2
∑
j∈[n]
ηj ·
∣∣∣Σ′i/Σ′∣∣∣ ≤ 6∑
i∈[n]
ηi.
This finishes the proof of the lemma.
Finally we prove Lemma 5.3:
Proof of Lemma 5.3. We start with the following claim, which states that entries of Qt and Qt−1
only differs by a small multiplicative factor.
Claim C.5. Suppose that the learning rate η ≤ 1/6 and let x0 = 1/n = x1. Then for any t ≥ 2,
Qt is a (η1, . . . , ηn)-approximate to Q
t−1, where ηj = 2ηx
t−2(j) + 4ηxt−1(j) for each j ∈ [n].
Combing Claim C.5 and Lemma C.2, we have
‖xt − xt−1‖1 ≤ 8
∑
j∈[n]
ηj = 8
∑
j∈[n]
(
2xt−2(j) + 4xt−1(j)
)
η = 48η.
This finishes the proof of Lemma 5.3.
Proof of Claim C.5. Let x0 = 1/n = x1. By the updating rule of optimisitic Hedge, we have for
any t ≥ 2, i, j ∈ [n] that
qtj(i) =
exp(−η(2xt−1(j)ℓt−1(i)− xt−2(j)ℓt−2(i))) · qt−1j (i)∑
k∈[n] exp(−η(2xt−1(j)ℓt−1(k)− xt−2(j)ℓt−2(k))) · qt−1j (k)
≤ exp(ηx
t−2(j)) · qt−1j (i)∑
k∈[n] exp(−2ηxt−1(j)) · qt−1j (k)
= exp
(
ηxt−2(j) + 2ηxt−1(j)
) · qt−1j (i)
≤ (1 + 2ηxt−2(j) + 4ηxt−1(j)) · qt−1j (i).
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The second step follows from ℓt ∈ [0, 1]n and the last step follows from exp(a) ≤ 1 + 2a for
a ≤ 1/2. The other side holds similarly:
qtj(i) =
exp(−η(2xt−1(j)ℓt−1(i)− xt−2(j)ℓt−2(i))) · qt−1j (i)∑
k∈[n] exp(−η(2xt−1(j)ℓt−1(k)− xt−2(j)ℓt−2(k))) · qt−1j (k)
≥ exp(−2ηx
t−1(j)) · qt−1j (i)∑
k∈[n] exp(ηx
t−2(j)) · qt−1j (k)
= exp
(− ηxt−2(j)− 2ηxt−1(j)) · qt−1j (i)
≥ (1 − ηxt−2(j)− 2ηxt−1(j)) · qt−1j (i).
Thus completing the proof.
C.3 Proof of Corollary 5.4
The algorithm works as follow. We set
η =
(n logn)1/4
m1/2T 1/4
and Br = 1 at initialization, for any player i ∈ [m] and τ = 1, . . . , T
1. Play xti according to BM-Optimistic-Hedge, and receive ℓ
t
i.
2. If
∑τ
t=2 ‖ℓti − ℓt−1i ‖2∞ +
∑τ
t=2 ‖xti − xt−1i ‖21 ≥ Br.
(a) Update Br+1 = 2Br, r ← r + 1, ηr = min
{√
n log n
Br
, η
}
.
(b) Start a new run of BM-Optimistic-Hedgewith learning rate ηr.
For any round r, we use Tr to denote its final iteration and
Ir =
Tr∑
t=Tr−1+1
‖xti − xt−1i ‖21 +
Tr∑
t=Tr−1+1
‖ℓti − ℓt−1i ‖2∞.
Then we have
swap-regretTr−1+1:Tr ≤
2n logn
ηr
+ 2ηr
 Tr∑
t=Tr−1+1
‖xti − xt−1i ‖21 +
Tr∑
t=Tr−1+1
‖ℓti − ℓt−1i ‖2∞

≤ 2(n logn)3/4 · T 1/4m1/2 + 2
√
n lognBr + 2ηr · Ir
≤ 2(n logn)3/4 · T 1/4m1/2 + 2
√
n lognBr + 2
√
2n lognIr
≤ 2(n logn)3/4 · T 1/4m1/2 + 4
√
2n lognIr
≤ 2(n logn)3/4 · T 1/4m1/2 + 4
√
2n logn ·
√√√√( T∑
t=2
‖xti − xt−1i ‖21 +
T∑
t=2
‖ℓti − ℓt−1i ‖2∞
)
The first step follows from Lemma 5.2, the second step follows from the definition of Ir and the fact
1
ηr
≤ 1
η
+
√
Br
n logn
=
m1/2T 1/4
(n logn)1/4
+
√
Br
n logn
The third step follows from ηr ≤
√
n log n
Br
≤
√
n logn
Ir/2
, and the last step comes from
√
Br ≤
√
2Ir.
Since the number of round is at most O(log T ), we have
swap-regretT ≤ logT
2(n logn)3/4T 1/4m1/2 + 4√2n logn ·
√√√√2( T∑
t=1
‖xti − xt−1i ‖21 +
T∑
t=1
‖ℓti − ℓt−1i ‖2∞
)
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If all players adopt the algorithm, then we know their learning rate is no greater than η = (n logn)
1/4
m1/2T 1/4
,
thus we know ‖xti − xt−1i ‖1 ≤ O(η) = O
(
(n logn)1/4
m1/2T 1/4
)
(see Lemma 5.3) and ‖ℓti − ℓt−1i ‖∞ ≤∑
j 6=i ‖xtj − xt−1j ‖1 ≤ m ·O(η) = O
(
m1/2(n logn)1/4
T 1/4
)
. Thus the swap regret is at most
O
(
(n logn)3/4m1/2T 1/4 logT
)
.
If the player is facing an adversary, then ‖xti−xt−1i ‖1 ≤ 2 and ‖ℓti− ℓt−1i ‖∞ ≤ 1, thus we conclude
its regret is at most
O
(√
n lognT logT + (n logn)3/4m1/2T 1/4 logT
)
.
D Another no swap regret algorithm
We prove the optimistic variant of a folklore algorithm, originally appeared in [7], could also achieve
fast convergence of swap regret. Our perturbation analysis again plays a key role in the regret
analysis.
Define Φ to be all swap functions that map [n] to [n]. We have |Φ| = nn. For any φ ∈ Φ, define the
swap matrice Sφ as: Sφi,j = 1 if φ(i) = j and S
φ
i,j = 0 otherwise. It is easy to see that S
φ contains
exactly one 1 each row.
[7] treats each swap matrice Sφ as an expert, and run Hedge algorithm on all nn swap matrices. At
time t, the output strategy pt is determined by these experts via solving a fix point problem3. The
optimisitic variant of [7] is shown in Algorithm 1. We first analysis the regret,
Algorithm 1
1: for t = 1, 2, . . . , do
2: Play pt and receive the loss vector lt.
3: Update
qt+1(φ) =
xt(φ) exp(−η(2xtSφℓt − xt−1Sφℓt−1))∑
φ∈Φ x
t(φ) exp(−η(2xtSφℓt − xt−1Sφℓt−1)) ∀φ ∈ Φ
4: Compute xt+1 = xt+1Q(t+1), where
Q(t+1) =
∑
φ∈Φ
qt+1(φ)Sφ.
5: end for
Lemma D.1. Algorithm 1 achieves regret
swap-regretT ≤
n logn
η
+ 2η
T∑
t=2
‖xt − xt−1‖21 + 2η
T∑
t=2
‖ℓt − ℓt−1‖2∞.
3The algorithm is not efficient in general. However, we can turn it into an effiecient one by considering only
n2 swap matrices that are equal to indentical mapping except for one coordinate. The regret bound will only
blow up by a
√
n factor.
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Proof. According to the updating rule, for any φ ∈ Φ, we have
swap-regretT =
T∑
t=2
〈xt, ℓt〉 −max
φ∈Φ
T∑
t=2
xtSφℓt
=
T∑
t=2
〈xtQ(t), ℓt〉 −max
φ∈Φ
T∑
t=2
xtSφℓt
=
T∑
t=2
∑
φ∈Φ
xt(qt(φ)Sφ)ℓt −max
φ∈Φ
T∑
t=2
xtSφℓt
=
T∑
t=2
∑
φ∈Φ
qt(φ) · xtSφℓt −max
φ∈Φ
T∑
t=2
xtSφℓt
≤ n logn
η
+ η
T∑
t=2
max
φ∈Φ
∣∣xtSφℓt−1 − xt−1Sφℓt−1∥∥2
≤ logn
η
+ 2η
T∑
t=2
‖xt − xt−1‖21 + 2η
T∑
t=2
‖ℓt − ℓt−1‖2∞.
The fifth step follows the regret bound of optimistic Hedge and the last step follows from the fact
that for any φ ∈ Φ,∣∣xtSφℓt − xtSφℓt∣∣2 = ∣∣xtSφℓt − xt−1Sφℓt + xt−1Aφℓt − xt−1Sφℓt−1∣∣2
≤ 2
∣∣xtSφℓt − xt−1Sφℓt|2 + 2|xt−1Sφℓt − xt−1Sφℓt−1∣∣2
= 2〈xt − xt−1, Sφℓt〉+ 2〈xt−1Sφ, ℓt − lt−1〉
≤ 2‖xt − xt−1‖21‖Sφℓt‖2∞ + 2‖xt−1Sφ‖1‖ℓt − ℓt−1‖2∞
≤2‖xt − xt−1‖21 + 2‖ℓt − ℓt−1‖2∞.
Thus completing the proof.
It remains to show that the environment is stable. Again, since xt is the stationary distribution of
Q(t), we only need some perturbation analysis onQ(t). In particular, we have
Lemma D.2. For any t, Q(t) is (6η, . . . , 6η) approximate to Q(t+1).
Proof. For any φ, we have
qt+1(φ) =
qt(φ) exp(−η(2xtAφℓt − xt−1Aφℓt−1))∑
φ∈Φ q
t(φ) exp(−η(2xtAφℓt − xt−1Aφℓt−1))
≤ q
t(φ) exp(η)∑
φ∈Φ q
t(φ) exp(−2η)
≤ (1 + 6η)qt(φ)
Similarly, we have
qt+1(φ) =
qt(φ) exp(−η(2xtAφℓt − xt−1Aφℓt−1))∑
φ∈Φ q
t(φ) exp(−η(2xtAφℓt − xt−1Aφℓt−1))
≥ q
t(φ) exp(−2η)∑
φ∈Φ q
t(φ) exp(η)
≥ (1− 6η)qt(φ)
Thus, for any i, j ∈ [n], we have
Q
(t+1)
i,j =
∑
φ∈Φ
qt+1(φ)Sφi,j ≤ (1 + 6η)
∑
φ∈Φ
qt(φ)Sφi,j = (1 + 6η)Q
(t)
i,j
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and
Q
(t+1)
i,j =
∑
φ∈Φ
qt+1(φ)Sφi,j ≥ (1− 6η)
∑
φ∈Φ
qt(φ)Sφi,j ≥ (1 − 6η)Q(t)i,j
Thus we concludeQ(t) is (6η, . . . , 6η) approximate to Q(t+1).
Combining the above results, we have
Theorem D.3. Suppose every player uses Algorithm 1 and choose η = O
(
( lognnm2T )
1/4
)
, then each
individual’s swap regret is at most O
(
m1/2n5/4(logn)3/4T 1/4
)
.
Proof. By Lemma D.1, for any palyer i ∈ [m], we have
swap-regretT ≤
n logn
η
+ 2η
T∑
t=2
‖xti − xt−1i ‖21 + 2η
T∑
t=2
‖ℓti − ℓt−1i ‖2∞
≤n logn
η
+ 2η
T∑
t=2
‖xt − xt−1‖21 + 2mη
T∑
t=2
∑
j 6=i
‖xtj − xt−1j ‖21
where wt denotes the other player’s strategy. Moreover, since Q(t−1) is (6η, . . . , 6η) approximates
to Q(t), we know
‖xti − xt−1i ‖1 ≤ 8 ·
n∑
i=1
6η = O(nη)
holds for any i. Thus we have
swap-regretT ≤
n logn
η
+ 2η
T∑
t=2
‖xt − xt−1‖21 + 2mη
T∑
t=2
∑
j 6=i
‖xtj − xt−1j ‖21
≤ n logn
η
+O(η3n2m2T ).
Choosing η = O
(
( log nnm2T )
1/4
)
, the regret is
swap-regretT = O
(
n5/4(log n)3/4T 1/4m1/2
)
.
E Price of anarchy
In this section, we show that a large class of no swap regret algorithm satisfies the low approximate
regret property (see Definition E.2). Thus when all players adopt such algorithm, they experience
fast convergence to an approximately optimal social welfare in smooth games (see Definition E.1).
In particular, we show that the average social welfare converges to an approximately optimal welfare
at rate O(1/T ). The proof in this section is straightforward, our aim is to point out that such fast
convergence rate generally holds for no-swap regret algorithms. We first introduce the smooth game.
Recall L(x) =∑i∈[m] Li(x) is the summation of each individual’s loss under strategy profile x.
Definition E.1 (Smooth game). A cost minimization game is (λ, µ)-smooth if for all strategy profiles
x and x⋆,
∑
i Li(x⋆i , x−i) ≤ λ · L(x⋆) + µ · L(x).
A wide range of games belongs to smooth game, including routing games, auctions, etc. We refer
interested reader to [25] for detailed coverage.
We next introduce the definition of low approximate regret.
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Definition E.2 (Low approximate regret [14]). A learning algorithm satisfies the low approximate
regret property for given parameters (ǫ, A(n)) , if
(1− ǫ)
T∑
t=1
〈xt, ℓt〉 ≤ min
i
L(i) +
A(n)
ǫ
.
Lemma E.3. The BM reduction transfers the low approximate regret property. In particular, if we
reduce from a no external regret algorithm satisfying low approximate regret with(ǫ, A(n)), then the
no swap regret algorithm satisfies low approximate regret with (ǫ, nA(n)).
Proof. For any fixed i, using the low approximate regret property, we know
(1− ǫ)
T∑
t=1
〈qtj , xt(j)ℓt〉 ≤ min
i′
T∑
t=1
xt(j)ℓt(i′) +
A(n)
ǫ
≤
T∑
t=1
xt(j)ℓt(i) +
A(n)
ǫ
.
Consequently, we have
(1− ǫ)
T∑
t=1
〈xt, ℓt〉 = (1− ǫ)
T∑
t=1
〈xtQ(t), ℓt〉
= (1− ǫ)
T∑
t=1
n∑
j=1
〈xt(j)qtj , ℓt〉
= (1− ǫ)
n∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
〈qtj , xt(j)ℓt〉
≤
n∑
j=1
(
T∑
t=1
xt(j)ℓt(i) +
A(n)
ǫ
)
=
T∑
t=1
n∑
j=1
xt(j)ℓt(i) +
nA(n)
ǫ
=
T∑
t=1
ℓt(i) +
nA(n)
ǫ
.
Thus concluding the proof.
A direct corollary of Lemma E.3 and Theorem 3 in [14] is
Theorem E.4. In a (λ, µ)-smooth game, if all players use no swap regret algorithm generated from
BM reduction and a no external regret algorithm satisfying low approximate regret property with
parameter ǫ and A(n) = log n, then we have
1
T
T∑
t=1
L(xt) ≤ λ
1− µ− ǫ ·OPT+
m
T
· 1
1− µ− ǫ ·
n logn
ǫ
.
where OPT denotes the optimal social welfare, i.e.,minx L(x).
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